{"id":"CVE-2026-67238","published":"2026-09-23T20:17:13.297","lastModified":"2026-09-24T16:17:09.780","description":"RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.","cvssScore":null,"cvssSeverity":null,"cvssVector":null,"cwes":["CWE-400"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.7","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.1","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x96j-244m-mrr2","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.7","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.1","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x96j-244m-mrr2","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":null}