{"id":"CVE-2026-90044","published":"2026-09-16T11:17:17.660","lastModified":"2026-09-21T14:17:28.530","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path\n\nIn ffs_epfile_write_iter() and ffs_epfile_read_iter(), when ffs_epfile_io()\nfails with an error other than -EIOCBQUEUED, the io_data structure (`p`) is\nfreed. However, for AIO operations, the kiocb cancel function was already\narmed and kiocb->private was set to `p`.\n\nIf a concurrent cancel operation (such as sys_io_cancel()) executes after\nffs_epfile_io() fails but before the function frees `p`, a Use-After-Free\ncan occur when the cancellation handler accesses the freed pointer.\n\nTo securely fix this race condition, we must properly un-arm the\ncancellation. Invoking `kiocb->ki_complete()` does exactly this by\nacquiring `ctx->ctx_lock` and safely removing the kiocb from the active\nsequence. In doing so, it ensures that a parallel io_cancel can no longer\ndiscover the kiocb, effectively closing the race window.\n\nWe then return -EIOCBQUEUED to notify the VFS layer that the kiocb has been\nconsumed and it should avoid attempting to complete the request again or\ntriggering subsequent completion handlers.","cvssScore":7.8,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/153b5ecd29ed055562400bc17c91df3fd869b0ce","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a2fb2d12b87b43724230abb52a1440617c7b6cc","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5f0e80a03e87bd932487e03248eae3ba3ed7b45","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e78dcb1f7ec271449c54984dc90c62a5ba272de7","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}