{"id":"CVE-2026-90069","published":"2026-09-17T17:16:55.830","lastModified":"2026-09-18T18:17:40.710","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning\n\nACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the\nsynchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers\nclone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()\ncurrently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no\nstorage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT\nwrite past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report\na slab OOB write.\n\nAllocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,\ncopy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the\nexisting fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize\nbecause an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.","cvssScore":7.8,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}