{"id":"CVE-2026-97437","published":"2026-09-24T17:17:21.810","lastModified":"2026-09-25T13:17:27.300","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()\n\nThe bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a\ncharacter count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting\nfor the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME\nheader size:\n\n  if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))\n\nThis computes: name_len + 16 > e_size\n\nThe correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes\nbefore the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):\n\n  sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +\n  name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size\n\nWhich computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size\n\nThe correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h\nand is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used\nin the readdir path.\n\nA crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size\nbut large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing\nntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.\n\nAdditionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the\ndeclared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing\ncomparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup\npath.","cvssScore":7.1,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H","cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a8149a20e46086c756c2a9202e377c0b649a0c3","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa1bdbb39f49c5bc9779316891c40005517842a5","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed6da1abeec50db9060d714f03743fe0b63e4fe4","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}