{"id":"CVE-2026-97938","published":"2026-09-25T11:17:21.193","lastModified":"2026-09-25T11:17:21.193","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nreboot: fix cad_pid use-after-free race\n\ncad_pid is a single kernel-wide struct pid pointer. proc_do_cad_pid()\nreads it and passes it to pid_vnr() without protecting the lifetime of\nthe referenced struct pid. A concurrent writer can replace cad_pid and\ndrop the final reference to the old struct pid after the reader has\nloaded the pointer but before pid_vnr() has finished dereferencing it,\ncausing a use-after-free.\n\nkill_cad_pid() has the same lifetime race when it passes cad_pid to\nkill_pid().\n\nAt the time this issue was reported, an unprivileged user could reach the\nsysctl through user and PID namespaces because cad_pid was registered in\npid_table[]. Moving cad_pid back to the global reboot sysctl table\ncorrected that namespace and permission mismatch, but did not fix the\nunderlying lifetime race.\n\nFix this by treating cad_pid as an RCU-protected pointer at both read\nsites and by waiting for a grace period before dropping the old reference\non the write side.\n\ncall_rcu(&old_pid->rcu, ...) cannot be used here because free_pid()\nalso queues pid->rcu; queueing the same rcu_head twice can corrupt the\nRCU callback list.\n\nOriginal KASAN crash stack:\n  kernel/pid.c:545 pid_nr_ns()        # reads freed pid->level\n  kernel/pid.c:556 pid_vnr()          # calls pid_nr_ns()\n  kernel/pid.c:775 proc_do_cad_pid()  # calls pid_vnr(cad_pid)","cvssScore":null,"cvssSeverity":null,"cvssVector":null,"cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a88f78df753993469dab4d1831f8fb4256a9468","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a17b0e053197a6a42cdc75e75a35b17aa662088","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad72e2566643fff7f01666d845fb026898155e1f","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}