CVE-2026-102649

9.9 CRITICALpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-26 · Updated 2026-10-26

AI risk analysis

Summary: The Burrito Kubernetes operator accepts unsigned webhook events when webhook secrets are missing or empty, allowing attackers to forge pull request events and trigger unauthorized terraform plans that may be posted to real PRs, exposing infrastructure changes.
Exploitability: Exploitation requires network access to the burrito-server webhook endpoint and knowledge of a tracked repository's URL; no authentication is needed due to missing signature verification.
Blast radius: An attacker could trigger unauthorized terraform plans for arbitrary branches using the operator’s stored credentials, potentially exposing sensitive infrastructure changes in real pull request comments.
Detection: Look for `POST /api/webhook` requests with empty or missing `X-Hub-Signature` or `X-GitHub-Event` headers that result in creation of `TerraformPullRequest` custom resources referencing real pull request numbers but mismatched branches; check controller logs for plan execution tied to forged payloads.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to Burrito version 0.13.0 or later, where webhook secret validation is enforced and unsigned events are rejected.

webhook-spoofingauth-bypassterraformkubernetesci-cd

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

Burrito is a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software (TACoS) Kubernetes operator. Prior to 0.13.0, `POST /api/webhook` accepts unsigned GitHub and GitLab events when a `TerraformRepository`'s credentials omit `webhookSecret` or set it to an empty value, including credentials configured for git authentication and polling. `Credential.WebhookSecret` is optional, and `go-playground/webhooks` skips signature or token verification when the secret is empty. Anyone who can reach `burrito-server`'s endpoint and knows a tracked repository's URL can forge events to create or delete `TerraformPullRequest` custom resources with attacker-chosen `Branch`, `Base`, and `ID` fields. For GitHub `pull_request` events, the controller fetches changed files using the real pull request number but does not cross-check the payload's branch against that pull request. Pairing a real, existing pull request number with an unrelated existing branch in the same repository can therefore cause an unauthorized `terraform plan` for affected layers using the operator's stored git and cloud credentials. Code analysis also indicates that the resulting plan can be posted to the real pull request's comment thread, exposing and misattributing another branch's infrastructure changes. Auto-apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so this vulnerability alone cannot force a `terraform apply`; plan-time provider and data-source code execution depends on the selected branch's contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.0.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

Weaknesses

CWE-306, CWE-863

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

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