CVE-2026-112887

Gitea Actions task tokens authenticate to the REST API as a shared system user with a negative ID, which repository, organization, project and key filters treated as having no owner restriction, and the token carried no API scope to restrict user-scoped routes. A user who can run a workflow could use the job's token with `GET /api/v1/user/repos` to list every repository on the instance, including private repositories of other users and organizations, with their metadata. Repository contents remained protected by per-repository permission checks. System users now own nothing, and `/api/v1/user` routes other than `GET /api/v1/user` accept only individual and bot accounts.

• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39945
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/40115
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.3.0
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8r36-6j2c-3gmv

• https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.3.0/
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39945
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/40115
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.3.0
• https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8r36-6j2c-3gmv

• UNSCOREDCVE-2026-103091PoC
• HIGHCVE-2026-105635PoC
• HIGHCVE-2026-107811PoC
• UNSCOREDCVE-2026-112192PoC
• MEDIUMCVE-2026-113668PoC
• UNSCOREDCVE-2026-117649PoC
• HIGHCVE-2026-118759PoC
• CRITICALCVE-2026-57116PoC

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