CVE-2026-114611

9.1 CRITICALpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-22 · Updated 2026-10-23

AI risk analysis

Summary: The Apple MDM enrollment endpoint in OCO-Server before 1.2.3 uses `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` during signature verification, bypassing certificate chain and trust validation; this allows an attacker with knowledge of a victim device's serial number to forge a signed enrollment request using a self-signed certificate, obtain the victim's MDM identity certificate and private key, and hijack the device's record in the database.
Exploitability: Exploitation requires only knowledge of a registered device's serial number and the ability to craft and submit a forged PKCS#7-signed enrollment request; no authentication or privileged access is needed.
Blast radius: An attacker who exploits this can fully impersonate any targeted MDM-enrolled device, enabling persistent remote management, data exfiltration via MDM channels, and potential lateral movement if the device has network or credential access to other systems.
Detection: Defenders should monitor for unexpected `.mobileconfig` enrollment responses containing PKCS#12 payloads with non-standard or mismatched serial numbers, especially when accompanied by a sudden change in the `UDID` field of an existing `mobile_device` database record.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to OCO-Server version 1.2.3 or later, which removes `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` and enforces full certificate chain validation for enrollment requests.

mdmcertificate-validation-bypassauthentication-bypassdevice-hijackpkcs7

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Weaknesses

CWE-295

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

Related CVEs

Related by shared AI tags and CWE weakness class. Browse the full archive.