CVE-2026-115770
9.6 CRITICALpublic exploit availablePublished 2026-11-04 · Updated 2026-11-04
AI risk analysis
- Summary
- In Pocket ID versions 2.2.0–2.12.0, a user can request an email verification token for an address they control, change their account email to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the original token to falsely mark the new address as verified, bypassing proper email ownership validation.
- Exploitability
- Exploitation requires only valid user credentials (low-privileged access) and control over a target email address; no special tools or complex conditions are needed.
- Blast radius
- Relying applications that use verified email for account linking or provisioning may incorrectly associate the attacker’s identity with another user’s account, potentially enabling account takeover or unauthorized access.
- Detection
- Log entries showing a VerifyEmail call with an email_verification_token that was issued for a different email address than the one currently bound to the user account may indicate exploitation; compare token creation timestamp/email with subsequent UpdateUser calls and VerifyEmail attempts.
- Prioritized remediation
- Upgrade to Pocket ID version 2.12.0 or later, which fixes the token binding to prevent reuse after email changes.
Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.
NVD description
Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-345
Public exploit & PoC references
All references
Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.
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