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CVE-2026-53942

9.9 CRITICALpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-23 · Updated 2026-10-23

AI risk analysis

Summary
A GitHub Actions workflow in conda/conda executes an external template-rendering action using attacker-controlled repository and branch references obtained from a pull request comment trigger, allowing an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution via unsandboxed Jinja2 template rendering with elevated privileges.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker with permission to comment on issues or pull requests in the affected repository and craft a malicious comment containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate, along with a PR-controlled repository and branch pointing to a malicious template.
Blast radius
Successful exploitation would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the GitHub Actions runner, potentially compromising secrets, infrastructure, and downstream users relying on the conda ecosystem.
Detection
Monitor GitHub Actions workflow runs triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate for execution of external actions (e.g., conda/actions/template-files) that perform unsandboxed template rendering; look for unusual checkout of non-default repositories or branches in the workflow run logs.
Prioritized remediation
Upgrade to commit 9c0f238 or later in the conda/conda repository, which patches the vulnerability by sandboxing the Jinja2 environment and removing unsanitized template rendering from the PR-triggered workflow path.
rcegithub-actionstemplate-injectionpr-pwnprivilege-escalation

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

Weaknesses

CWE-94

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

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