CVE-2026-53942
9.9 CRITICALpublic exploit availablePublished 2026-10-23 · Updated 2026-10-23
AI risk analysis
- Summary
- A GitHub Actions workflow in conda/conda executes an external template-rendering action using attacker-controlled repository and branch references obtained from a pull request comment trigger, allowing an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution via unsandboxed Jinja2 template rendering with elevated privileges.
- Exploitability
- Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker with permission to comment on issues or pull requests in the affected repository and craft a malicious comment containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate, along with a PR-controlled repository and branch pointing to a malicious template.
- Blast radius
- Successful exploitation would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the GitHub Actions runner, potentially compromising secrets, infrastructure, and downstream users relying on the conda ecosystem.
- Detection
- Monitor GitHub Actions workflow runs triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate for execution of external actions (e.g., conda/actions/template-files) that perform unsandboxed template rendering; look for unusual checkout of non-default repositories or branches in the workflow run logs.
- Prioritized remediation
- Upgrade to commit 9c0f238 or later in the conda/conda repository, which patches the vulnerability by sandboxing the Jinja2 environment and removing unsanitized template rendering from the PR-triggered workflow path.
Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.
NVD description
Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-94
Public exploit & PoC references
All references
Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.
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