CVE-2026-61729

9.4 CRITICALpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-30 · Updated 2026-10-30

AI risk analysis

Summary: Two webhook endpoints in SOCFortress CoPilot prior to v0.1.76 used identical hardcoded fallback header values for authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to bypass JWT and invoke privileged active-response and alert-creation APIs directly against Wazuh and OpenSearch.
Exploitability: Trivial to exploit if the deployment uses default or unchanged header secrets; requires only knowledge of the publicly exposed header value and network access to the affected endpoints.
Blast radius: An attacker could trigger arbitrary Wazuh active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints, disable defensive controls, or inject forged alerts to manipulate incident workflows and evade detection.
Detection: Monitor for POST requests to /api/graylog/invoke, /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold, or /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma that lack valid JWT tokens but include the known default header value (e.g., 'X-Graylog-Api-Key' or 'X-Velociraptor-Api-Key' set to a publicly exposed hardcoded secret); also watch for Wazuh active-response commands issued without prior authenticated API calls.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to SOCFortress CoPilot version 0.1.76 or later, which fixes the hardcoded fallback vulnerability.

auth-bypasswebhookactive-responsewazuhopensearchhardcoded-secret

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

Weaknesses

CWE-306, CWE-798

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

Related CVEs

Related by shared AI tags and CWE weakness class. Browse the full archive.