CVE-2026-61826

10 CRITICALpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-30 · Updated 2026-10-30

AI risk analysis

Summary: Bazarr's Plex OAuth API namespace lacks authentication on several endpoints, allowing unauthenticated attackers to clear credentials, inject arbitrary API keys, bind attacker-controlled Plex accounts via PIN, and tamper with configuration, leading to credential theft, SSRF, and integration denial of service.
Exploitability: Exploitation requires only network access to the Bazarr instance and knowledge of the affected endpoints; no authentication, PIN, or prior state is required for most actions.
Blast radius: Successful exploitation allows full compromise of the Bazarr-Plex integration, including credential theft via SSRF, persistent configuration tampering, and denial of service by disabling the integration.
Detection: Look for unauthenticated POST requests to /api/plex/oauth/logout, /api/plex/apikey, /api/plex/oauth/pin, /api/plex/select-server, /api/plex/oauth/servers, /api/plex/webhook/create, /api/plex/webhook/delete, or /api/plex/encrypt-apikey endpoints in web server access logs; also monitor for unexpected changes to Bazarr configuration files (e.g., config.yaml) or anomalous outbound requests containing X-Plex-Token headers to external domains.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to Bazarr version 1.5.7-beta.14 or later, which adds authentication to the affected endpoints and implements proper OAuth state validation.

auth-bypassssrfcredential-theftconfig-tamperingdosweb

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Weaknesses

CWE-352, CWE-862

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

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