CVE-2026-68495

7.5 HIGHpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-01 · Updated 2026-10-02

AI risk analysis

Summary: The FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary CBOR parser fails to enforce name length limits when decoding JSON object property names, allowing attackers to craft malicious CBOR documents with unbounded property names that can exhaust memory and cause denial of service.
Exploitability: Exploitation is straightforward requiring only the ability to submit data to a CBOR parsing endpoint, with no additional privileges needed beyond normal access to the parsing service.
Blast radius: The vulnerability affects any application using Jackson's CBOR parser with default StreamReadConstraints settings, potentially causing widespread denial of service across multiple services that accept CBOR input.
Detection: No reliable host or network indicator is derivable from the published description.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to jackson-core 2.16.0 or later to receive the fix for name length validation in CBOR parsing.

denial-of-servicememory-exhaustioncborjson

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Weaknesses

CWE-400, CWE-770

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

Related CVEs

Related by shared AI tags and CWE weakness class. Browse the full archive.