CVE-2026-68496

7.5 HIGHpublic exploit available

Published 2026-10-01 · Updated 2026-10-02

AI risk analysis

Summary: The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary fails to enforce the maxNameLength limit when decoding JSON object property names, allowing unbounded property name lengths that can lead to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This affects binary JSON formats like Smile and CBOR where property names are not validated against configured limits.
Exploitability: Easy to exploit with no privileges required; attacker only needs to submit a Smile document with a single property name of unbounded length to a parsing endpoint that uses the Smile module.
Blast radius: High impact across all applications using jackson-dataformats-binary with Smile or CBOR formats, potentially causing widespread denial of service when parsing malicious documents.
Detection: No reliable host or network indicator is derivable from the published description.
Prioritized remediation: Upgrade to jackson-core 2.16.0 or later to enable proper name length validation in the Smile parser.

denial-of-servicememory-exhaustionbinary-jsonsmilecbor

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Weaknesses

CWE-400, CWE-770

Public exploit & PoC references

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

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