CVE-2026-85033

The AVRCP Target role in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c keeps its vendor-dependent response transmit state in a per-connection object selected by connection index (get_avrcp_tg()), with the per-transfer context (tid, sent_len, and the BT_AVRCP_TG_FLAG_TX_ONGOING flag) stored in the user_data of the queued response net_buf. The AVCTP teardown handler avrcp_disconnected() did not cancel tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and did not release the buffers still queued on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending, so a link drop in the middle of a fragmented response left the buffer on the list with TX_ONGOING still set. A remote AVRCP Controller can trigger this deterministically: it issues a vendor-dependent command whose response exceeds one AVRCP fragment (for example GetElementAttributes or GetCapabilities), lets bt_avrcp_tg_vendor_tx_work() emit the START fragment, and then drops the ACL link instead of sending REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE. The AVCTP control channel requires an encrypted BR/EDR link (BT_SECURITY_L2), so the attacker must be a paired peer within radio range; no user interaction is needed. Because the Target objects are static and reused, the next connection landing on the same connection index finds the stale buffer at the head of vd_rsp_tx_pending. Every run of the TX work sees TX_ONGOING and returns immediately, so all further vendor-dependent responses queue behind the stale head and are never sent — a persistent loss of AVRCP Target function that no timeout clears and only a reboot recovers. Each cycle also leaks one response buffer from a shallow application pool, and a new peer that sends REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE clears the stale TX_ONGOING via bt_avrcp_tg_process_continuing_cmd(), causing the un-sent remainder of the previous peer's response to be transmitted to it. The fix cancels tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and unrefs every buffer on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending in avrcp_disconnected(); since the TX context lives in the buffer user_data, releasing the buffers also resets the TX state machine. There is no memory corruption: the pre-fix buffer is leaked with a live reference, so no use-after-free arises.

• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/47728746bb52863607f06072c13a0a524ad6b654
• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2fqc-xhj4-qvp7

• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/47728746bb52863607f06072c13a0a524ad6b654
• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2fqc-xhj4-qvp7

• MEDIUMCVE-2026-101100PoC
• HIGHCVE-2026-102030
• UNSCOREDCVE-2026-103937PoC
• MEDIUMCVE-2026-104421PoC
• MEDIUMCVE-2026-104427PoC
• HIGHCVE-2026-106203
• MEDIUMCVE-2026-106243
• MEDIUMCVE-2026-106262

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