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CVE-2026-98366

7.8 HIGH

Published 2026-10-06 · Updated 2026-10-07

AI risk analysis

Summary
The Linux kernel's RDMA/rxe driver has a race condition where memory region access flags are validated after the protection domain (PD) is already reassigned, potentially leading to use-after-free vulnerabilities when a PD is freed while still referenced by active memory windows.
Exploitability
Exploitation requires careful crafting of memory registration operations with specific flag combinations, likely needing kernel-level access or a local user context with RDMA capabilities, but the vulnerability is relatively straightforward to trigger once the right conditions are met.
Blast radius
If exploited, this vulnerability could lead to kernel crashes, memory corruption, and potentially privilege escalation in systems running RDMA-enabled kernels with active memory window operations.
Detection
No reliable host or network indicator is derivable from the published description.
Prioritized remediation
Apply the kernel patch that fixes the order of PD reassignment and access flag validation in rxe_rereg_user_mr() function, specifically addressing the race condition between PD reference counting and memory window cleanup.
kernelrdmamemory-corruption

Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.

NVD description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument: if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) { rxe_put(old_pd); rxe_get(pd); mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd; } if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) { if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR) return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); mr->access = access; } Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned. mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup() writes to freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591 __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200 __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370 rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80 Allocated by task 591: ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540 Freed by task 591: ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210 uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0 ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0 Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either applies every requested change or none.

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

All references

Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.

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