CVE-2026-61707
9 CRITICALpublic exploit availablePublished 2026-10-29 · Updated 2026-10-29
AI risk analysis
- Summary
- Unsanitized Jinja2 template rendering in SOCFortress CoPilot allows authenticated customer_users to upload malicious templates that execute arbitrary Python code as root when admins or analysts generate reports, leading to full tenant data compromise and credential theft.
- Exploitability
- Low-privilege authenticated users (customer_user) can exploit this with minimal effort by uploading a crafted template file and triggering report generation via existing endpoints.
- Blast radius
- Full compromise of all tenants' incident data, SIEM logs, and stored connector credentials; potential lateral movement via internal service access through the HTML/PDF renderer.
- Detection
- Monitor for non-admin users uploading files with .jinja, .j2, or unexpected MIME types via /case-report-template/upload; watch for report generation requests triggered by low-privilege users in backend logs. No reliable host or network indicator is derivable from the published description.
- Prioritized remediation
- Upgrade to SOCFortress CoPilot version 0.1.76 or later, which patches the unsandboxed Jinja2 rendering and adds proper template scoping.
Analysis generated locally by garnet-coder (no data left the box). AI-assisted — verify against primary sources before acting.
NVD description
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, in the reported deployment, case-report templates uploaded by `customer_user`, the lowest-privilege portal role, are later executed by non-sandboxed Jinja2 engines when an admin or analyst generates a report. The `/case-report-template/upload` route in `backend/app/incidents/routes/db_operations.py` validates only the filename-derived MIME type, not the template content. Templates share a global store without customer_code scoping, and `customer_user` can also list, download and delete them, allowing an attacker to replace a legitimate default template under the same name. In `backend/app/incidents/services/reports.py`, `render_document_with_context` uses `DocxTemplate` without a sandbox; in `backend/app/incidents/services/reports_pdf.py`, `render_html_template` uses a non-sandboxed `Environment` without autoescaping. Normal privileged requests to `POST /api/incidents/report/generate-report-docx` or `/generate-report-pdf` therefore evaluate attacker-controlled Jinja expressions as Python on the backend. The reported deployment executes commands as root, exposing all tenants' incident and SIEM data and stored connector credentials. The HTML/PDF wkhtmltopdf renderer additionally permits local-file reads and requests to internal services. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-94, CWE-862, CWE-1336
Public exploit & PoC references
All references
Source data: NVD (nvd.nist.gov), public domain. Exploit-DB.ai adds local AI analysis for defensive use only.
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